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Abstract: While preferences for conformity are commonly seen as an important driver of pro-social
behaviour, only a small set of previous studies has explicitly tested the behavioural mechanisms
underlying this proposition. In this paper, we report on two interconnected experimental studies
that jointly provide a more thorough and robust understanding of a causal mechanism that links
social information (i.e., information about the generosity of others) to donations via changing the
perception of a descriptive social norm. In a modified dictator game, Experiment 1 re-investigates
this mechanism adding further robustness to prior results by eliciting choices from a non-student
sample and by implementing an additional treatment that controls for potential anchoring effects
implied by the methods used in previous investigations. Experiment 2 adds further robustness
by investigating the link between social information, (descriptive) norm perception and giving at
the individual, rather than the group average, level. We find that an exogenous variation of social
information influences beliefs about others’ contributions (descriptive social norm) and, through this
channel, actual giving. An exploratory analysis indicates that this causal relationship is differently
pronounced among the two sexes. We rule out anchoring effects as a plausible confound in previous
investigations. The key findings carry over to the individual level.
Keywords: Social Norms; Donations; Experiment; Social Information; Altruism
1. Introduction
The desire to adhere to social norms is thought to be a strong predictor of individuals’ pro-social
behaviour [1–6]. Individuals tend to be more cooperative in social dilemmas or give more to charitable
causes when such behaviour is perceived to be the social norm. This holds for both types of social norms
commonly distinguished in the literature, whether for descriptive norms, which refer to expectations
that individuals hold regarding the most common behaviour in a situation, and for injunctive norms,
which refer to expectations regarding what others think should be done in a given situation [7].
Experimental investigations provide controlled evidence to support these claims. One strand of
experiments uses treatments in which subjects receive, prior to making their own decision, so-called
descriptive social information, i.e., information about the pro-social behaviour of others. Shang and
Croson [8] find that donations to a public radio station increase (decrease) when listeners observe high
(low) donations made by another listener. Similarly, Frey and Meier [9] show that students are more
likely to give to a student aid fund when they observe that a large share of their peers has donated in
the past, and Alpizar et al. [10] report a significant increase in giving to a national park, when soliciting
donations from visitors who are made aware of the significant contributions made by previous visitors.
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Another strand of experiments deploys designs that also provide information regarding injunctive
norms. A key paper in this context is Bicchieri and Xiao [3], who directly compare the effect of
descriptive and injunctive norms in the dictator game. The descriptive norm is implemented through
social information on the most common behaviour among previous participants, the injunctive norm
through social information on the behaviour that a majority of participants see as appropriate in
this task. They find that subjects in the role of dictator are more likely to offer an equal split, if they
are either informed that this has been the most common behaviour or the behaviour seen as most
appropriate by dictators in a previous session. However, when participants receive social information
on both norms and this information is not aligned, then sharing behaviour is more strongly affected by
descriptive norms.1
While the link between providing social information and pro-social behaviour is well documented,
less is known about the underlying behavioural mechanism. Theoretical explanations commonly
invoke a preference for conformity [16] or self-image concerns [17,18]. These theories suggest that
deviating from a norm results in disutility, while adhering to it leads to a utility gain even when
transgressions or compliance are not publicly observable. Social information would activate this
behavioural mechanism either by increasing norm salience (by reminding decision makers about the
existence of a descriptive or injunctive norm) or by changing individuals’ norm perception. So far,
this behavioural mechanism remains little tested, and the evidence linking the provision of social
information, its effect on the perception of an existing norm and the effect on pro-social behaviour is
confined to a very small set of studies.
In this paper, we report on two interconnected experimental studies whose joint contribution is to
provide, through careful design choices and through eliciting choices from a non-student population,
a more thorough and robust understanding of this causal mechanism. Together, they contribute
to the existing literature by establishing, in an incentivized setting, whether social information
affects the perception of a descriptive social norm and thereby affects giving to a pro-social cause.
By eliciting empirical expectations, we shed more light on a mechanism that operates through
affecting descriptive norm perception. We implement additional design variations that provide
further robustness to previous results [3]. Experiment 1 follows Croson et al. [19], who provide social
information in a survey experiment on charitable giving and, through mediation analysis, establish
that social information affects hypothetical giving behaviour through changing the perception of a
descriptive norm. Our design overcomes the potential hypothetical bias implicit in survey designs by
implementing an incentivized design in which participants can donate actual money. In this, it builds
on Bicchieri and Xiao [3], who use a classic dictator game combined with providing information on
descriptive and injunctive norms and eliciting corresponding expectations. Their paper is an important
stepping stone that highlights how receiving social information can affect expectations about both
a descriptive norm and an injunctive norm at the same time. It is thus difficult to disentangle the
independent influence that both kinds of norms have on behaviour [1]. In their experiment, Bicchieri
and Xiao [3] provide convincing evidence that both kinds of expectations can be affected to a similar
degree by the same piece of information, but that the resulting pro-social behaviour is mainly affected
by empirical expectations, with normative expectations having little independent effect. This insight is
central for understanding the effect of social information on pro-social behaviour in situations where
descriptive and injunctive norms are not aligned. Experiment 1 re-investigates this descriptive norm
channel first identified in Bicchieri and Xiao [3] adding further robustness by using a non-student
subject pool, by employing a modified dictator game with a real-world public good, by using a set of
1 The effects of social information on behaviour are not confined to the domain of generosity, with comparable
relationships documented in many other areas such as energy conservation [11], political participation [12], honesty [13],
retirement saving [14] and high stakes career choices [15].
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social information treatments with a different range of descriptive norms2 and by an extra treatment
that controls for possible anchoring effects in the social information treatments. Experiment 2 provides
additional robustness by proposing a new ‘revised choice’ design for investigating the link between
social information, (descriptive) norm perception and giving at the individual level rather than at the
group average level.
Both of our experiments utilize a modified dictator game [20] in which subjects can contribute
to an existing public good through their giving. This task format and the specific public good we
employ (climate change mitigation) have the advantage of conceivably limiting the role of reciprocity
as an alternative mechanism through which social information could affect behaviour in our setting.3
As is common in the literature, we compare donations in a baseline condition to a setting in which
subjects receive social information in the form of either low or high average contributions observed
for subsets of the baseline population prior to making their own decision. Our approach differs from
previous field studies in also eliciting participants’ beliefs regarding the pro-social behaviour of others
through an additional and incentivized task. This allows us to study the effect of social information on
norm perception. In the first experiment, we do so in the controlled environment of an artefactual field
experiment to which we invite members of the general public [24]. The second experiment is a lab
experiment run with student subjects. Providing social information should have the strongest effect on
norm perception in situations where there is some ambiguity about the ruling norm. This is likely to
be true in our setting in light of the high variance of donations in the baseline.
We use two different empirical strategies to investigate the proposed mechanism. As in Croson
et al. [19], we conduct a mediation analysis. This analysis is supplemented by a regression approach
that uses random treatment assignment as an instrument by design for norm perception [3,25,26].
In an additional treatment, we rule out that instead of affecting norm perception, the effect of social
information mainly operates through a known psychological confound, namely anchoring [27]. Since
it has been shown that irrelevant numerical information (e.g., a birth date) can affect giving, the same
could be true for any given number including those used to convey information on others’ giving
behaviour in the high and low treatment. To validate our results against this concern, we introduce an
irrelevant information treatment in which subjects are shown a number that conveys no information
on a contribution norm.
The second experiment resembles the first in most of its central elements, but is designed to better
understand the role of social information at the individual level. For this purpose, after submitting an
initial decision, subjects receive new information on the donation behaviour of others. They are then
given the opportunity to either confirm or revise the amount they wish to donate. In this, our design
resembles the sequential dictator game proposed in Cason and Mui [27]. Eliciting choices in this order
provides us with an opportunity to study how subjects react to a discrepancy between their initial
donation, their expectation of others’ behaviour (their initially perceived descriptive social norm) and
the actual observed behaviour of others.
The results of the two experiments and their significance can be summarized as follows:
both experiments confirm and offer additional support for the existence of a positive and causal
2 Bicchieri and Xiao [3] compared a selfish norm to a norm that suggests an equal split. We compare a norm suggesting a low
donation amount and a norm suggesting a high donation amount to a situation where no social information is provided.
3 There are other common experimental task formats in which reciprocity is a more plausible explanation as to why subjects
react to social information. For instance, in standard repeated public good experiments, a significant fraction of subjects is
known to react to social information; they increase their contributions upon observing high contributions made by other
group members and decrease their contributions upon observing low contributions (see, e.g., Keser and Van Winden [21],
Fischbacher et al. [22] or Chaudhuri [23]). This form of conditional cooperation could be interpreted as either expressing
preferences for conformity or as direct reciprocity (i.e., reciprocating the observed kindness of others). In a standard public
goods game, subjects benefit immediately and directly from the contributions made by other group members. Thus, there
is a large scope for reciprocity to materialize. In our experimental task, in contrast, the marginal benefit of a donation to
another subject is close to zero and, due to the slow reactivity of the climate system, only materializes with significant delay.
This greatly limits the room for direct reciprocity compared to the standard public goods game setting.
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link between social information and pro-social behaviour. Experiment 1 provides further evidence
for a mechanism that operates through norm perception. Specifically, an exogenous variation
of social information influences beliefs on others’ contributions (descriptive social norm) and,
through this channel, actual giving. Exploratory analysis indicates that this causal relationship
between social information, beliefs and contributions might be differently pronounced among the
two sexes. We complement the existing literature on social information by ruling out anchoring
effects as a plausible confound implied by the methods used in previous investigations. Experiment 2
demonstrates that these results carry over to the individual level in the following way: when subjects
experience a discrepancy between their own behaviour and the actual pro-social behaviour of others,
they are more likely to revise their initial decision. Subjects are, however, not more likely to revise their
initial decision, if they observe a discrepancy between their own empirical expectations and the actual
giving of other subjects.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we describe the design of both
experiments, followed by behavioural hypotheses derived from the existing literature in Section 3.
Section 4 contains the results. We conclude with a brief discussion in Section 5.
2. Experimental Procedures and Design
2.1. Decision Task and Treatments: Experiment 1
On the first screen, we remind subjects that they will receive €10 as compensation for taking part
in the study—as previously announced in the recruitment materials. In a modified dictator game [20],
they are then given the opportunity to donate any share of their compensation to a common account
and are told that this account would be used by the experimenters to offset global CO2 emissions.4
A decision to give up some of the compensation therefore provides a global public good whose
beneficiaries are distributed across the globe and, as the instructions emphasize, will experience the
potential benefits of reduced CO2 with significant temporal delay. Subjects’ personal monetary benefit
from the donations made by other subjects in the experiment is therefore close to zero and at most
marginal. This is a desirable feature of this design: in contrast to standard public good experiments
(see, e.g., Keser and Van Winden [21], Fischbacher et al. [22] or Chaudhuri [23]), this design provides
little traction for reciprocity or ‘being the sucker’ as motives for subjects’ response to the information
that others have donated a high or low amount.
The two social information treatments were equivalent to the BASEline in all stages except one:
before stating their preferred donation amount, subjects reached an additional screen that informed
them about the average donations made by previous participants. In the HIGH social information
treatment, subjects were informed that the experiment had been conducted before and that fifty
previous participants had donated €7 on average. Similarly, in the LOW social information treatment,
subjects learn that fifty prior participants had donated €1 on average. We choose €1 and €7 to be below
and above median donations in the BASEline. This allows us to study how norm perception and
behaviour of the median subject is affected by a novel piece of information. The exact text shown on
the (HIGH or LOW) information screen read as follows:
“In previous sessions of this experiment, 50 participants on average gave €7 (HIGH) / €1 (LOW) to
retire CO2-permits”
4 As in Diederich and Goeschl [28] and Löschel et al. [29], their decision was implemented by retiring CO2-permits via the
EU Emissions Trading System. Before subjects made any decision, they were given some basic information on the exact
procedures via a brief text that informed them about greenhouse gas emissions, the functioning of the offset scheme and the
amount of CO2 that could be reduced by €1. We also explained to participants that a certificate of total emission reductions
issued by the emission-trading-agency would be posted at a public notice board of the university where the study was
conducted at the end of the study period, to allow them to verify the total (but not the individual) amount of money donated
to carbon reductions.
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These procedures slightly deviate from the social information treatments in previous studies with
the aim of enhancing the perception of a commonly shared (descriptive) norm. Instead of referring
to only one previous donor in a minimal design [8], we refer to donations made by a larger group of
individuals. Similarly—having all decided to take part in the same experiment—our reference group
could arguably be perceived as more similar than in previous experiments [10], which again could
enhance the perception of a commonly shared norm [30]. To avoid deception, we make sure that both
statements used in the social information treatments are factually correct. They are derived from the
respective behaviour of 50 subjects making their decisions in BASE sessions conducted several months
before the social information treatments. As in previous studies [3,8], the information we provide is
based on a selected subset of previous participants, and the formulation we choose does not suggest in
any conceivable way that it represents a representative subset.5
We conduct one additional control treatment (NUMBER) to account for the possibility that
cognitive anchoring effects—based on the number shown on the information screen itself rather
than the social information contained in it—could influence giving. Previous studies have found
that presenting an unrelated number (e.g., a date of birth or a social security number) can affect
subsequent donation decisions because the number serves as a mental anchor [27]. We thus conduct a
control treatment that allows us to investigate the importance of this potential confound in our setting.
In NUMBER, the information screen contains the same number (seven) as the HIGH treatment. This
number, however, is embedded in a context that does not provide any reference to a possible social
norm. In particular, we inform participants that 50 prior participants from the same experiment were
living within a seven-kilometre radius.6
A central difference to previous field experiments is that our design includes an additional task
that can be used to explicitly test for the underlying mechanisms through which social information
affects behaviour. To reach a better understanding of this mechanism, we analyse how the perception
of a (descriptive) social norm is affected by social information. For this purpose, we ask participants to
state their beliefs regarding the donation behaviour of other participants. A descriptive social norm
is defined as the behaviour that is seen as most common in a given situation [1,33]. We thus asked
participants about their beliefs regarding the mean donation made by the other participants in their
experimental session. There was an incentive in place for stating a correct belief: if stated beliefs were
within the range of −€0.5 and +€0.5 around the true session mean, participants received an additional
payment of €2. An absolute deviation of €1.5 from the true average yielded €1.7
2.2. Decision Task and Treatments: Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we extend the social information treatments of Experiment 1 (HIGH and LOW),
with the aim of studying in more detail how social information affects pro-social behaviour at the
individual level. In particular, we are interested in the degree to which the strength of a deviation
between the perceived norm or own behaviour and observed behaviour (i.e., social information) affects
the propensity to change donation behaviour in a subsequent decision. For this purpose, subjects
go through the same donation and belief elicitation tasks as in the BASE treatment of Experiment
1. After stating their beliefs, participants reach an information screen similar to those in the HIGH
5 This obviously does not rule out the possibility that some subjects might still misunderstand the factually correct information
we provide in that way, just as some subjects in Bicchieri and Xiao [3] might wrongly believe that the session data they are
shown come from a representative session. Our method, thus, clearly avoids actively misleading subjects in any way; a clear
form of deception. We leave it to our readers to decide whether the scope for such misunderstanding is sufficiently small to
still conform to the commonly shared norm of avoiding deception in experimental economics or rather falls into a grey area.
We refer the interested reader to Ortmann and Hertwig [31] and Colson et al. [32] for a more general discussion of deception
and the different views that exist within the discipline as to what such grey area might encompass.
6 As in the other treatments, this information is based on the actual place of residence of baseline participants.
7 In a few, early baseline sessions, belief elicitation was not incentivized. To increase the reliability of estimates we added an
incentive mechanism in later baseline sessions, as well as all social information sessions.
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and LOW treatments. There are two key differences to Experiment 1, apart from reversing the order.
The first is that the social information provided stems from only two randomly drawn participants
in their session. Thus, the information provided has, on the one hand, a higher variance. On the
other hand, as the information emerges only from two other individuals, its effects on changing norm
perception might be weaker. The second key difference lies in the introduction of a ‘revised choice’
design: subjects reach a second donation screen after receiving social information. On this second
screen, subjects are asked to either confirm or revise their initial decision on the amount to be donated.
Thus, in contrast to Experiment 1, we are not interested in the direct effect of social information on
beliefs, which are elicited before subjects receive the additional information. Rather, eliciting choices
and beliefs in this order allows us to study, for each participant, how differences between their initial
donation or perceived norm and observed behaviour (social information) affect a change in behaviour
between initial and final choices.
2.3. Procedures
Data were collected between November 2011 and July 2012 (Experiment 1) and in July 2014
(Experiment 2) at an Experimental Lab of a large German university, and both experiments were
implemented in z-Tree [34].8 Overall, we conducted 26 sessions with up to 15 subjects per session
(Experiment 1: 23 Sessions, Experiment 2: 3 Sessions). Upon arrival, subjects were seated at a random
computer terminal, and a printed version of the general instructions was handed out and read aloud
by one of the experimenters. Any form of communication between participants was not allowed,
and questions were answered in private. Subjects could not participate in more than one session and
submitted their decisions anonymously. For this purpose, they generated a personal code that was also
used for anonymous payment. At the end of each session, subjects received a sealed envelope with an
earnings receipt based on this code. The payment itself was executed in a different room by a research
assistant who was not present at any time of the experimental sessions. Thus, overall earnings were
not observed by the experimenters, and subjects were made aware that their identity would not be
revealed to them. At the end of a session, subjects completed several follow-up questionnaires eliciting
standard demographics, as well as questions regarding the experimental tasks and the public good
offered in the donation task (climate change mitigation). Sessions lasted around 75 min (Experiment 1)
and 45 min (Experiment 2), and the average payment for all tasks in Experiment 1 was €15.47 ranging
from €1.05–€26.00.9 The average earnings for Experiment 2 was €11.20 (Min.: €4 and Max.: €14)
including a show-up fee of €4.
To achieve some parallelism with previous field experiments, while at the same time maintaining
the possibility to elicit additional information required to identify the underlying behavioural
mechanisms, we conducted an artefactual field experiment [24]. For this purpose, we recruited
N = 274 participants from the general public to Experiment 1. The BASEline contains 144 observations,
the HIGH and LOW social information treatments 47 subjects each and the irrelevant information
treatment (NUMBER) 36 subjects. Participants from the general population were recruited via
advertisements in two different local newspapers with a combined readership of approximately
160,000 readers. As an additional recruitment tool, leaflets about the experiment were posted in
all neighbourhoods and public places of the city in which the study was located. The response
rate to all recruitment tools was similar, and there were no significant differences in demographic
attributes and decisions within the experiment. Individuals interested in participating contacted a
research assistant for further information and were invited to a session, randomizing treatments at the
session level. The research assistant made sure that none of the subjects had previous experience with
8 The procedure, as well as a translation of the z-Tree instructions are provided in the Appendix.
9 Total earnings and duration for Experiment 1 encompass a second task (public goods game) that we analyse in a separate
paper [35] and that took place subsequent to any decisions analysed in this paper.
Games 2018, 9, 91 7 of 25
economic experiments or had taken part in a previous session. The BASE sessions were conducted
before the other treatments in order to be able to derive the social information provided in the
subsequent information treatments (HIGH, LOW, NUMBER) from actual behaviour. As expected,
random assignment led to nearly balanced demographic attributes across treatment cells. There were
no significant differences for the attributes displayed in Table A1 of the Appendix, with the exception
of income.10 Experiment 2 was a follow-up study conducted with an N = 45 sample of student subjects
recruited from the standard subject pool via the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments
(ORSEE) [36]. We excluded participants with prior experience in social-preference tasks.
3. Hypotheses
In the subsequent section, we formulate hypotheses based on observations from prior studies and
the mechanism of conformity suggested therein.
3.1. The Effect of Social Information on Behaviour
Providing social information could affect pro-social behaviour in opposite directions: crowding-in
or crowding-out of giving [8]. Theory predicts that individuals who only care about the aggregate
level of the public good provided via their donations reduce their giving by the same amount by which
they learn that donations made by others exceed their expectations. Such complete crowding-out was
originally suggested by Roberts [37]. Models of impure altruism, in which individuals derive some
warm glow utility from their own donation, also suggest crowding-out, but less than complete [38].
In contrast, according to the crowding-in hypothesis, individuals are expected to contribute larger
amounts when they observe others contributing as well. Such crowding-in effects have been attributed
to a preference for conformity such that individuals prefer to match the giving behaviour of their
peers [16,39]. Previous experiments on the effects of providing social information suggest that
crowding-in could dominate crowding-out [8,10]. This implies that social information suggesting a
high donation to be the norm will lead to higher giving than social information that suggests low
donations to be the norm. Since we use a similar experimental design, we expect crowding-in effects
to dominate, leading to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a. Subjects in the HIGH treatments will donate larger amounts than subjects in the BASE
treatment where no social information is provided.
Since Croson and Shang [40] found a reduction in donations when social information suggests
selfish behaviour to be the descriptive norm, we expect a similar outcome for the LOW treatment:
Hypothesis 1b. Subjects in the LOW treatments will donate smaller amounts than subjects in the BASE
treatment where no social information is provided.
3.2. Mechanisms by Which Social Information Affects Behaviour
It has been suggested that social information may affect pro-social behaviour through its effect
on the perception of a descriptive social norm. While most previous papers have only tested for
this exact mechanism implicitly, they usually assumed to some degree that social information affects
pro-social behaviour through a preference for conformity [16,39]. Individuals holding such preferences
receive additional utility from adhering to a (perceived) social norm while experiencing disutility
from breaking a norm. Preferences for conformity are actionable even in the absence of audience
10 Our core results continue to hold when controlling for the demographic attributes contained in Table A2. As self-reported
income might not capture the wealth status of an individual, we further report participants’ assets as a binary variable
indicating whether participants own a house or an apartment. With respect to reported assets, there exists no significant
difference between the four treatments.
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effects, as individuals simply follow their internal moral calculus. A mechanism of social information
reflecting such preferences can be summarized as working through the following two steps. First,
it assumes that subjects use the social information they observe to update their empirical expectations
regarding others’ typical contribution behaviour (descriptive norm). Second, they then adapt their own
generosity to conform with this updated norm [19]. Bicchieri and Xiao [3] describe a similar mechanism
and find support for it in their data. We follow these two steps when formulating our hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a. Social information affects the perception of a descriptive social norm, leading to differences in
stated beliefs in the HIGH, LOW and BASE treatment in line with the information provided.
Hypothesis 2b. Differences in donations between treatments are driven by the effect of social information
on beliefs.
In an additional control treatment (NUMBER), we investigate a potential confounding effect.
In particular, there could be the concern that anchoring effects are present in the social information
treatments. If so, they would lead to wrongly attributing any effects on behaviour to the social
information provided instead of also reflecting the fact that simply presenting a number without any
normative context could already influence pro-social behaviour. It has been shown that anchoring
effects make individuals recall a figure from their short-term memory when they are uncertain about
aspects of the decision environment [41]. Importantly, anchoring effects of this kind have been shown
to influence pro-social behaviour: Cason and Mui [27] report a relationship between dictator transfers
and irrelevant information, i.e., the date of birth. An alternative hypothesis reflecting this concern
reads as follows:
Hypothesis 3. If individuals are presented with irrelevant information—providing a NUMBER from the
contribution space without any reference to a norm—they contribute larger amounts compared to a setting
without any additional information (BASE). If anchoring fully accounts for any effects in the social information
treatments, there are no differences between HIGH and NUMBER.
Experiment 2 was designed to test the underlying mechanism at the individual level. If a
preference for conformity is driving social information effects, individuals should be more likely to
revise their initial donation amount when the differences between their own behaviour or perceived
norm and observed behaviour of others is large. In particular, we expect:
Hypothesis 4a. Subjects receiving social information that suggests a high donation norm to donate
higher amounts.
Hypothesis 4b. The likelihood of a revision depends on the strength of the social information received.
4. Results
In the following, we present tests for these four hypotheses. For Hypotheses 1–3, we rely on data
from Experiment 1, while Hypotheses 4 is tested with data from Experiment 2.
4.1. Social Information Matters
The effect of providing social information on the amount donated can be summarized as follows:
in BASE, subjects give 31 percent of their initial endowment (median 20 percent), and 61 percent
of subjects contribute a non-zero amount.11 This compares to an average donation of 44 percent of
11 Overall, these baseline results fall into a range comparable to that observed in Diederich and Goeschl [42] and
Löschel et al. [29], who looked at contributions to the same public good. As these studies vary the price of giving, there is
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the initial endowment in HIGH and 27 percent in LOW. Differences in median giving are even more
pronounced (HIGH: 50 percent, LOW: 10 percent), while the propensity to give is not as strongly
affected by providing social information (HIGH: 70 percent, LOW: 60 percent). Figure 1 summarizes
these outcomes and displays the results of the associated significance tests.
Figure 1. Average contributions and frequency of non-zero contributions by treatment.
In accordance with Hypothesis 1a, we find that providing HIGH social information significantly
increases average donations by 43 percent relative to donations in BASE (Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.04).
The propensity to give is also slightly higher in HIGH compared to BASE, although not significantly
so (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.26). With respect to Hypothesis 1b, we do not find evidence that
providing LOW social information reduces giving significantly. Average donations are slightly
reduced, but neither the propensity to give nor the size of donations differ statistically compared to
BASE (Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.47; Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.85).12 These findings are robust to
controlling for demographic attributes in a set of regressions presented in Table A2 of the Appendix.
We summarize the above findings as:
Result 1a. Compared to BASE, donations (but not the propensity to give) are significantly higher when
providing HIGH social information.
Result 1b. Compared to BASE, neither donations, nor the propensity to give are lower when providing LOW
social information.
only limited comparability to our setting. Carpenter et al. [43] used a similar elicitation method, but allowed participants to
give to a charity of their own choosing. In their setting, donations reach 68 percent of the initial endowment.
12 One reason for a weaker effect of the LOW social information treatment, which is in line with the results we discuss in
more detail below, could be that the information provided differs less from the expectations that subjects hold regarding the
giving of others in BASE.
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4.2. Mechanism
4.2.1. Changing Norm Perception
It has been suggested that providing social information affects the perception of descriptive social
norms and thereby actual behaviour. Here, we ask whether this proposed mechanism finds support in
the data generated by Experiment 1. Our test is comprised of several steps that address the different
parts of this statement.
In a first step, we simply compare subjects’ stated empirical expectations between the two social
information conditions (HIGH, LOW) and the BASEline where beliefs are elicited without providing
social information beforehand. In accordance with the proposed mechanism, social information
significantly affects beliefs about the contribution behaviour of others (i.e., the perceived descriptive
norm). As shown in Figure 2, in BASE, stated beliefs amount to 38 percent of the endowment
on average. Subjects alter their norm perception in line with the information they receive: in the
LOW treatment, they expect giving to amount to 24 percent of the endowment, and in the HIGH
treatment, they expect average giving to amount to 51 percent. Stated beliefs differ significantly at
the 1%-level (Mann–Whitney test). While subjects update perceived norms in the expected direction,
updating is only partial, such that stated beliefs are not fully aligned with the social information
provided. We summarize these observations as:
Result 2a. Providing social information has an effect on the perception of descriptive norms. Compared to
BASE, subjects expect more giving by their peers in HIGH and less giving in LOW.
Figure 2. Beliefs about average contributions by treatment.
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Further evidence on the proposed mechanism comes from investigating the pairwise correlation
between contributions and stated beliefs in each treatment. If a sufficient number of individuals hold
preferences for conformity, there should be a positive correlation between the perceived norm and
actual behaviour. This is true for each of the treatments with correlation coefficient ρ ranging from 0.44
(p < 0.01) in BASE and 0.43 (p < 0.01) in LOW to 0.58 (p < 0.01) in HIGH.
A more sophisticated analysis is based on the results of two different regression frameworks
summarized in Table 1. Specifications 1 and 2 form the basis of a simple mediation analysis [44].
In Specification 1, we regress the two dummies for the HIGH and LOW treatment on giving (as a
percentage of the initial endowment). Restating Results 1a and 1b, there is a positive and significant
effect of providing HIGH social information and a negative and insignificant effect of providing LOW
social information. By including stated beliefs into the same regression framework in Specification
2, we provide evidence for a mediating effect of norm perception on this relationship. With beliefs
included, both treatment dummies become insignificant, while the regression coefficient for beliefs is
positive and highly significant. This provides a first indication for the presence of a mediating effect.
We investigate this effect more formally via a Sobel–Goldman test based on Specifications 1, 2 and
(3).13 This tests finds that the reduction in treatment effects is significant for both the HIGH and the
LOW treatment condition (p < 0.01). The sign of the coefficient for the LOW treatment even reverses.
From this analysis, we conclude that descriptive social norms fully mediate the influence of social
information on giving.
Table 1. Regression results: relationship of treatments, beliefs and contributions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st Stage 2nd Stage
Dependent Variable Contributions Contributions Beliefs Contributions
High (0 = No, 1 = Yes) 13.50 ** 2.736 13.78 ***
(6.093) (5.824) (3.104)
Low (0 = No, 1 = Yes) −4.164 6.514 −13.67 ***
(5.865) (5.891) (3.439)
Beliefs 0.781 *** 0.644 ***
(0.129) (0.244)
Constant 30.97 *** 1.682 37.50 *** 8.644
(2.889) (4.417) (1.643) (9.452)
N 238 238 238 238
R2 0.029 0.213 0.164 0.203
Prob > F / χ2 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Note: contributions, as well as beliefs are reported in percentage of endowment; robust standard errors in
parentheses; ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
In a final step, we test if this conclusion is robust against the concern that the mediator variable
itself could be endogenous. In particular, if stated beliefs are themselves determined by prior choices,
they might be endogenous in the prior analysis. To account for this potential problem, we follow
previous studies on the role of potentially endogenous beliefs in economic games and rely on an
instrumental variable framework (IV) [25,26,46]. As subjects are randomly allocated to the different
social information treatments, by design, treatment assignment can serve as an exogenous instrument
for beliefs. Under the validity of the exclusion restriction, this framework identifies the causal effect
of beliefs on behaviour (ibidem). Specification 3 shows the first stage of a Two-Stage Least Squares
(2SLS) estimation. Beliefs are significantly affected by the exogenous variation of social information
13 The Sobel–Goldman test is a test for the statistical significance of a mediation effect. It goes back to Sobel [45] and tests if the
relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable is affected in a significant way by the inclusion
of the mediating variable.
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provision.14 Specification 4 displays the second stage regression in which contributions are regressed
on instrumented beliefs. While the coefficient of beliefs is slightly smaller than in Specification
2, it remains highly significant, indicating a causal relationship between norm perception and the
amount given.15
Jointly, these results suggest that social information affects pro-social behaviour by changing
norm perception. This is in line with a mechanism based on preferences for conformity. We summarize
this as:
Result 2b. There is evidence for a causal link between social information affecting norm perception and thereby
amounts donated.
Does this mechanism apply uniformly within the sample or does it vary with observable
characteristics? There is some suggestive evidence indicating that members of the two sexes might
react differently to social information. Croson and Gneezy [47] reported females, in general, to be
more sensitive to context variations or cues in experimental settings investigating social preferences.
Providing social information could be seen as such a contextual variation. However, maybe more
applicable to the specific context we are interested in here, Croson et al. [48] found males to react more
strongly towards social information, albeit in a hypothetical choice experiment. Given this mixed
evidence, we extend the previous analysis to explore whether females and males reveal systematic
differences in contribution behaviour under the different social information treatments. In a second
step, we repeat the IV approach to investigate whether the proposed mechanism applies uniformly
across the two sexes.
Specification 1 in Table 2 reports regression results including dummies for treatments and gender,
as well as their interaction. Specification 2 repeats the same analysis with additional controls for
other demographic attributes included. The significant interaction effects found in both specifications
suggest that female participants are more strongly influenced by providing HIGH, but not LOW,
social information. The treatment effect for male participants is neither significant for the LOW, nor for
the HIGH treatment.16
Based on the previously investigated mechanism, this gender-specific treatment effect might exist
for two different reasons. First, social information might affect norm perception differently by gender.
Second, males and females might adhere to social norms differently, even when the perception of the
prevailing norm does not differ. We include interaction terms in the IV framework we introduce above
to test whether one or both of these explanations can account for gender differences in the treatment
effect. The first stage evidence shown in Specification 3 indicates no heterogeneity in the effect of
social information on norm perception.17 Evidence from the second stage regression suggests that the
desire to adhere to social norms is more pronounced among females. Beliefs are only weakly related to
behaviour for males, while this relationship is stronger for females. Jointly, this analysis suggests that
male participants are as likely as female participants to adapt their norm perception in line with the
social information presented; however, they are less prone to adhere to this newly-perceived norm.
14 This mirrors the results of the non-parametric analysis. Furthermore, a large F-statistic (F(2235) = 23.73) indicates that
instruments generated by random treatment assignment are not weak.
15 Testing for endogeneity formally via conducting a Hausman test indicates also that an endogeneity problem is not likely
(p = 0.65).
16 Non-parametric tests similarly show that giving in HIGH vs. BASE differs significantly for females (Mann–Whitney test,
p < 0.01), but not for males (Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.71).
17 Comparing treatment effect between sexes individually reveals at most a weak difference (male-high vs. female-high,
F(1231) = 0.01, p = 0.93; male-low vs. female-low, F(1231) = 3.26, p = 0.07). Similarly, testing treatment differences in
average beliefs separately for females and males results in significant effects when comparing high/low social information
to the baseline. Hence, both males and females adapt their beliefs under social information to a similar extent.
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Table 2. Regression results: treatment effects, gender and the causal mechanism.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st Stage 2nd Stage
Dependent Variable Contributions Contributions Beliefs Contributions
High (0 = No, 1 = Yes) 2.408 −0.299 8.921 *
(7.853) (8.170) (4.639)
Low (0 = No, 1 = Yes) −3.042 −7.573 −16.18 ***
(8.763) (10.30) (5.369)
Number (0 = No, 1 = Yes) 5.083 −4.517
(11.48) (11.00)
Female (0 = No, 1 = Yes) 6.430 −1.961 −2.013 −24.37
(5.997) (6.530) (3.363) (19.24)
Female × High 26.19 ** 35.29 *** 9.867
(11.47) (11.29) (6.124)
Female × Low −0.180 −0.980 4.730
(11.87) (13.62) (6.913)
Female × Number −3.805 16.53
(14.64) (14.66)
Beliefs 0.212
(0.359)
Beliefs × Female 0.923 *
(0.494)
Constant 26.79 *** −51.40 *** 38.68 *** 18.81
(4.705) (15.45) (2.579) (14.01)
Demographic Controls No Yes
N 273 226 237 237
R2 0.065 0.211 0.173 0.187
Prob > F 0.011 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Note: contributions, as well as beliefs are reported in percentage of endowment; demographic controls include
age, education in years, monthly net income, number of children and climate change attitude; robust standard
errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
4.2.2. There Is No Anchoring Confound
Before moving to the evidence from Experiment 2, we note in passing that an alternative
explanation based on anchoring effects can be ruled out as a driver of the treatment effects we
observe in the social information treatments. When comparing behaviour between the NUMBER and
the BASE treatment, there are no significant differences in average giving (BASE 31% vs. NUMBER
33%; Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.87). Similarly, the median corresponds to 20% of the initial endowment
in both treatments, and the propensity to give does not differ either.
In contrast to the social information treatments, there is also no evidence that providing a number
that does not convey any social information affects the norm perception of subjects. There is no
significant difference in stated beliefs between BASE and NUMBER (BASE 38% vs. NUMBER 39%;
Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.86). Overall, we take this as evidence that anchoring is not a confound
when analysing the mechanisms through which social information affects behaviour.
Result 3. Compared to BASE, neither beliefs, nor behaviour differ when subjects are presented with a piece of
irrelevant information in NUMBER.
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4.2.3. Social Information Effects at the Individual Level (Experiment 2)
The identification of treatment effects in Experiment 1 is based on the assumption that the social
information we provide to subjects differs sufficiently from what the median subjects perceives to
be the social norm. While this assumption derives its plausibility from the way our treatments are
constructed, there might still be considerable individual heterogeneity in norm perception. This raises
the natural question whether subjects for whom norm perception deviates more strongly from the
social information they receive are more or less reactive to this information. We investigate this
question by two major changes in the experimental design vis-à-vis Experiment 1. First, we reverse
the task order in Experiment 2. Subjects first state their beliefs and select an initial donation level
before receiving information on the average donations made by two other subjects in their session.
This allows us to identify to what degree social information and (initially) perceived norms differ for
each subject. Subjects are then given a choice between revising their initial decision or confirming it.
Thirty seven percent of subjects make use of the opportunity to revise their decision. This significant
rate of choice revisions could reflect the fact that more than 90 percent of subjects receive a piece of social
information that is not fully in line with their initial behaviour (93%) or their own expectations (91%).
Deviations to the negative and positive are equally common and almost symmetrically distributed
around zero. Most negative deviations fall into the range of [−2;0] and most positive into the range
[0;2], but some subjects receive social information that is substantially less in line with their own
expectations or behaviour.18
In a first step, analogous to Experiment 1, we ask how subjects react to the observed behaviour of
others. We do so in a simple regression framework (see Table 3) in which we regress the amount that
subjects donate in their final (second) decision on the social information they receive (1). To control for
the possibility that this effect depends on how the initial donation amount deviates from the mean
donation, we include this amount in Specification 2. In Specifications 3 and 4, we split the sample into
those subjects with a below (3) or above (4) median donation amount in the initial stage.
Table 3. Final Choice (Experiment 2).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Donation Final Donation Final Donation Final Donation Final
Observed Donation of Others 0.192 0.172 0.225 * 0.432
(0.151) (0.106) (0.110) (0.368)
Initial Donation (Demeaned) 0.481 **** 0.743 ** 0.242
(0.0897) (0.318) (0.225)
Constant 1.116 **** 1.150 **** 1.317 *** 1.572 ****
(0.296) (0.226) (0.425) (0.316)
N 45 45 28 17
R2 0.04 0.59 0.23 0.51
Prob > F 0.21 <0.01 0.03 <0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001.
Specification 1 indicates a positive, however statistically insignificant, relationship between the
final amount donated and the social information that subjects receive. As approximately half of the
subjects receive social information that suggests a lower norm of generosity and approximately half
of the subjects receive social information that suggests a higher norm of generosity, this observation
is not inconsistent with the findings of Experiment 1. Instead, the null result could simply reflect
two opposing effects that cancel each other out. In Specification 2, we account for the possibility that
effects of social information might depend on the initial level of generosity, as previously proposed
18 We provide histograms of the full distribution in Figures A1 and A2 of the Appendix.
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in Cason and Mui [27]. While initial and final choices are strongly correlated, we continue to find a
positive and statistically insignificant effect of social information. Specifications 3 and 4 complement
this analysis by separating the sample into those subjects whose initial donation is below or above the
median. The first group is more likely to receive a signal that suggests a higher norm of generosity,
while the second group is more likely to receive a signal that suggests a lower norm of generosity.
In Specification 3, we observe a weakly significant effect of social information, suggestive of a positive
relationship between social information and donations for those subjects who donate little initially.
Social information has little effect on subjects who initially donate an above median amount (4). In sum,
the effects of receiving social information suggestive of a high donation norm go in the same direction,
but are weaker than in Experiment 1.
In the main analysis of Experiment 2, we investigate whether social information leads to a change
in behaviour at the individual level and if such a change is more likely to occur when the information
received differs more strongly from initial behaviour or empirical expectations. Thirty seven percent of
subjects chose to revise their initial decision. According to the proposed mechanism, social information
should have a stronger effect on this choice if it conveys new information, i.e., if the absolute difference
between the subject’s initial donation (or empirical expectations) and the received information is large.
Among those subjects who receive information above the median strength, 12 out of 21 revise their
initial decision. Conversely, only five out of 24 subjects who receive information below or at the
median strength do so. This statistically significant difference (Chi2- test, p = 0.012) could suggest
a strong effect along the lines proposed. It could, however, also be a statistical artefact if there is a
significant regression towards the mean, i.e., if subjects with more extreme donations in their first
decision choose less extreme donations in their revised decision.19 To test for this possibility in a
regression framework, we follow the ex-post methods described in Barnett et al. [49] and Yu and
Chen [50]. Specifically, we estimate four specifications of a probit model with the propensity to revise
the amount donated between the initial and final decision as the dependent variable. Results are
displayed in Table 4. In Specifications 1 and 2, we investigate whether subjects are more likely to
change behaviour if they receive social information that differs more strongly in absolute terms from
their initial choice. To control for a potential regression to the mean effect, Specification 2 contains
the deviation of the initial choice from the mean donation as an additional control variable. It thus
controls for subjects’ deviation from the mean donation in their initial decision. Specifications 3 and
4 follow a similar strategy to investigate whether subjects are more likely to change their behaviour
upon observing donations of others that differ strongly from their own empirical expectations.
Specifications 1 and 2 indeed suggest that subjects are more likely to revise their initial decision if
they observe behaviour of others that differs strongly from their own behaviour. While this effect is
strongly significant in Specification 1, it is only weakly significant in Specification 2, which controls
for subjects’ initial donation amount. This suggests that regression towards the mean may partly
account for the observed pattern in Specification 1. Conversely, Specifications 3 and 4 do not suggest
that subjects are more likely to change their behaviour upon receiving social information that differs
more strongly from their own initial expectations. Jointly, this analysis provides evidence in line with
the idea that social information affects pro-social behaviour at the individual level, but also points
to important heterogeneities. The observation that social information has a more significant effect
on revisions if it deviates from previous behaviour than if it deviates from empirical expectations is
interesting and deserves attention in future investigations.
19 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for alerting us to this possibility in an earlier draft. For instance, subjects with a
high initial donation are more likely to observe another subject donating less. Any change induced through the observed
information will thus go in the same direction as a change resulting from a regression towards the mean. For this reason, we
do not analyse the strength of change, where such concerns would be exacerbated [27].
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Table 4. Choice Revisions (Experiment 2).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change Change Change Change
1 = Yes 1 = Yes 1 = Yes 1 = Yes
Absolute (Observed-Initial) 0.319 *** 0.197 *
(0.122) (0.109)
Initial Donation (Demeaned) 0.228 **
(0.0974)
Absolute (Observed-Belief) 0.142 0.0910
(0.118) (0.121)
Initial Belief (Demeaned) 0.306 **
(0.150)
Constant −1.029 *** −0.735 ** −0.544 * −0.480 *
(0.331) (0.322) (0.282) (0.290)
Observations 45 45 45 45
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
In light of mounting interest in the importance of norm compliance for economic behaviour [51],
we conduct an experimental investigation that adds to the existing evidence base on the
role of descriptive social norms for pro-social behaviour. In line with previous experimental
investigations [8–10], we find that providing social information that is suggestive of a high contribution
norm increases subjects’ donations to an existing public good, i.e., a crowding-in effect. This is also in
line with peer effects observed for donations in naturally occurring situations [52]. Our study goes
one step further by investigating the underlying mechanism for this treatment effect and by adding
further robustness to previous findings on the role of empirical expectations for this mechanism [3,19].
We find conclusive evidence that social information affects pro-social behaviour through changing the
perception of a descriptive norm. Jointly, these observations provide further support for the existence
of a mechanism that operates via a preference for conformity. The fact that we rule out anchoring as a
potential alternative mechanism that could have confounded the interpretation of earlier investigations
and the fact that we derive our results from a non-standard sample drawn from the general population
add further robustness to the generality of our results.
Our experiments also highlight that there might be important and overlooked heterogeneities in
individuals’ reactions towards social information. First, our exploratory analyses point to subtle gender
differences in how individuals react to social information. While members of both genders update their
empirical expectations upon observing social information, only females react to an updated norm in a
way that would be in line with preferences for conformity. In our experiment this gender difference is
sufficiently strong to fully account for the observation that only females increase their donations upon
receiving social information that suggest generosity to be the norm. Given the purely exploratory
nature of this finding, it would be worth studying more formally and explicitly to what degree this
observation generalizes beyond the context and subject pool we study here. Second, results from
Experiment 2 show that individuals are most likely to react to social information if this information
conveys a norm that strongly deviates from their own behaviour, yet they show little reaction if it
strongly deviates from their own expectations.
A better understanding of the underlying mechanisms and of these heterogeneities is not
purely of theoretical interest. In the context of climate change mitigation—the public good that
subjects can contribute to in our experiment—it has been recently argued that norm change can
be an important behavioural driver for increasing mitigation efforts [53]. Our findings show that
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influencing the flow of social information can indeed be an effective tool for policy makers to influence
individuals’ mitigation choices, contributing to a broader literature on the role of social norms for
pro-environmental behaviour [54]. However, we show that using social information in this way might
not be uniformly effective across all individuals as suggested by a heterogeneous treatment effect by
gender. Policy makers should also be aware that negative social information might more than offset
positive social information such that vicious circles between observed behaviour and norm perception
can emerge over time. For instance, studies on energy conservation and social information nudges
frequently observe so-called boomerang effects among individuals who learn that they conserve
more energy than their peers and subsequently increase their energy consumption [55]. Especially
in situations where a majority of individuals engage in a behaviour that is socially disapproved of
and this behaviour is otherwise not easily observable, it has been argued that policy makers could
instead communicate an injunctive norm to prevent creating a shared expectation of ‘everybody does
this’ [56]. However, as shown in Bicchieri and Xiao [3], when descriptive and injunctive norms are both
observable and send conflicting messages, it is mostly the former that significantly impact behaviour.
The mechanism, we study here also highlights that social norm interventions might be unsuccessful
for two separate reasons: either the presented information does not change the perception of the norm
or a change in norm perception does not reflect on actual behaviour.
Compared to naturally occurring situations, we simplify the decision environment in our
experiment along multiple dimensions, and thus, we believe that relaxing some of these simplifications
can shed further light on the process of norm formation. Introducing additional contextual factors
could shed further light on the transmission mechanisms between social information, norm perception
and behaviour. For our experimental participants, it is easy and costless to observe others’ behaviour.
They are provided with concise information immediately before making their own decision. In reality,
it might be significantly more difficult or even costly to observe others. In most instances, it is also
necessary to interpret others’ noisy behaviour, which clouds inference on the underlying social norm.
Another contextual factor that could affect the role of social information is its source. In Experiment 1,
we provide participants with information on fifty unspecific participants from previous sessions.
It appears plausible that individuals care more about conforming with norms that prevail within an
subjectively relevant group. For instance, findings from Goldstein et al. [30] and Costa and Kahn [57]
suggest that preferences for conformity could be much stronger, if the decision maker receives
information from a demographically or ideologically similar group of individuals.
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Appendix A. Procedure
Appendix A.1. General Instructions
General Instructions were handed to participants as a print-out.
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Check-in Check-in room:
Sign-in and generation of personal code
Experiment Laboratory:
Random seat assignment
General instructions read out loud (page 17)
Tasks implemented in z-Tree
• Contribution to climate change mitigation (page 18)
• Belief elicitation (page 20)
• Questionnaires on demographics and attitudes
Payment receipt distributed according to personal code
Payment Check-in room:
Subjects exchange payment receipt for cash
General Information
Dear participant,
Thank you for participating in this study. In the following you will be informed about the rules and
procedures. You have the opportunity to earn money. The payment depends on your decisions during
the experiment. Every participant has received the same printed instructions as you did. Please take
your time and read the instructions carefully.
No communication with other participants
Please do not communicate with the other participants. Otherwise we are forced to exclude you from
the experiment and you will have to forgo your payment. If you have any questions, please raise your
hand. The experimenter will answer your question quietly.
Procedure
Please make sure that you created your personal code. During today’s experiment, you will be asked
to insert your personal code. Your personal code ensures your decisions during the study to be
anonymous. The experiment is taking place at the computer and your tasks are explained step-by-step.
Please read the instructions on the screen thoroughly. If amounts of money are mentioned for a task,
these amounts refer to real payments being paid out—depending on your decisions—at the end of the
experiment.
It is important that you answer all questions; your data is treated anonymously.
Thank you!
Appendix A.1.1. Real Contribution Task
General Instructions
Dear participant,
Thank you for supporting our research. On this screen you receive general instructions on the
procedure. You will take several tasks. Please follow the instructions on the screen.
At the end of today’s experiment you receive your payment. At several points you can influence your
payment by your own decisions. Whenever this is the case you will be informed on the screen and you
will receive information on how to make your decisions.
Your decisions are anonymous. This is guaranteed by your personal code. In addition, you receive
your payment at the end in room 00.005a (check-in room). Therefore, the experimenters will not receive
information on your decisions and payments.
– – –
For your participation you receive ten Euro.
These ten Euro are paid to you at the end of today’s experiment in cash.
Alternatively, we offer you to use a share of these ten Euro to reduce global CO2 emissions.
In the following we explain how it is possible for us to reduce global CO2 emissions.
– – –
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What is CO2?
CO2 is a gas which is emitted by burning oil, coal, or fuel. It accrues from the manufacturing of goods
or the production of electricity as well as from travel by car or airplane.
Why does one try to reduce CO2?
The more CO2 gets into earth’s atmosphere, the more likely becomes the occurrence of the
environmental problem climate change. Scientists expect climate change to cause consequences
such as the rise of sea levels, the stronger spread of tropical diseases, or smaller yields in agriculture.
How is it possible to reduce CO2 emissions?
Within the European Union a binding limit has been installed which constitutes how much CO2 may be
emitted by large industrial companies. In order to emit CO2, these companies need emission permits.
These permits can be purchased from the emission-trading-registry of the Federal Environmental
Agency. After purchase these permits are not available to companies any longer. In this way,
European CO2 emissions are reduced by the amount of purchased permits. As the climatic system
reacts inertly to a change in CO2 emissions, the reduction action contributes only in approximately
50 years towards noticeable climate change mitigation.
What do we offer to you?
As soon as you completed reading the informational text, we offer you to purchase permits from the
German emission-trading-registry of the Federal Environmental Agency from your ten Euro. For each
Euro you can mitigate emissions of approximately 70 kg CO2, i.e., with your ten Euro you can reduce
CO2 emissions by a total of 700 kg. For example, 70 kg correspond to CO2 emissions arising from a
drive from Frankfurt am Main to Hamburg by car.
On average a German citizen emits 9 tons of CO2 per year (one ton equals 1000 kg). Therefore, 700 kg,
which may be reduced with your 10 Euro, correspond to a little less than the monthly CO2 emissions
of an average German.
How can you verify that your contribution was used to retire CO2 permits?
As permits for CO2 emissions are purchased through the emission-trading-registry of the Federal
Environmental Agency, the procedure can be monitored transparently. At the end of this study a
certificate of reduction –issued by the emission-trading-registry– will be posted at the notice board of
the Chair of Behavioural Economics (Prof. Dr. C. Schwieren).
– – –
Purchasing CO2 permits
On the following screen you may indicate the share of your ten Euro you would like to spend on
CO2 permits.
Social Information Treatments: In previous sessions of the experiment 50 participants gave €7/€1 on
average to retire CO2 permits.
Number Treatment: In previous sessions of the experiment 50 participants lived within a 7 km radius
around Heidelberg.
– – –
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On this screen you may purchase emission permits from a share of your ten Euros.
• Please insert into the blue field how much money you would like to use to retire CO2 permits and
thus reduce global CO2 emissions.
• You are free to indicate every integer between 0 and 10 Euro, i.e., you may fill in whole numbers
without decimal place (period or comma).
• Each Euro you are not using to purchase CO2 permits, you can take home at the end in cash.
<insert decision>
<summary screen displayed>
– – –
Appendix A.1.2. Instructions Estimates
In the following we ask you to appreciate the behaviour of the other participants in the room.
You should estimate how the other participants in the room decided on purchasing CO2 permits.
Depending on the accuracy of the estimate, you receive additional money.
– – –
Payment:
For your estimate you may receive additional payments. The more accurate your estimate of the other
participants, the more money you receive.
Calculation:
If your estimate deviates by 0.5 Euro (above or below) from the true value of today’s session, you receive
2 Euro.
If your estimate deviates by 1.5 Euro (above or below) from the true value of today’s session, you receive
1 Euro.
Question:
What do you think: How much did other participants on average give to purchase CO2 permits?
<insert estimate>
– – –
Appendix A.1.3. Instructions Experiment 2: Procedures
The contribution and belief elicitation task are equivalent to Experiment 1. We will thus only
describe the remaining screens (Social information, Revision).
Appendix A.1.4. Instructions Experiment 2: Social Information
We will show you now the average amount that two randomly selected participants in this
room have contributed. You will not receive any additional information regarding the identity of
these participants.
– – –
The other two participants have contributed <AVERAGE> Euro on average
– – –
Appendix A.1.5. Instructions Experiment 2: Revision
On this screen we are giving you the opportunity to change your initial contributions. At the end
of the experiment the decision you make on this screen will determine the outcome.
– – –
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If you don’t want to change your initial contribution please enter the same amount as before into the
blue field
If you want to change your initial contribution please enter the new amount into the blue field
– – –
<insert decision>
Appendix A.1.6. Additional Tables and Results
Table A1 summarizes the demographic composition across the four treatments of Experiment 1.
Table A1. Sample properties.
Baseline High Low Number Pooled
N = 144 N = 47 N = 47 N = 36 N = 274
Age (Years) 48.79 44.60 46.53 50.03 47.85
Female (%) 62.94% 46.81% 48.94% 55.56% 56.78%
Education (Years) 14.15 13.81 14.39 14.11 14.12
Monthly Net Income (€) 1232.80 1404.65 1748.39 1818.97 1409.87
Assets (%) 38.89% 29.79% 40.43% 44.44% 38.32%
Household Size 2.11 1.79 1.89 2.06 2.02
Number of Children 0.92 0.85 0.79 0.88 0.88
Climate Change Attitude 5.72 5.77 5.86 5.49 5.72
Note: the table reports mean values; climate change attitude corresponds to a mean score of four questionnaire
items retrieved from a 7-point Likert-scale; it includes belief in the existence of climate change, perceived
consequences of climate change arising and concern for one’s self and future generations; the scales range
from 1 (not convinced/concerned) to 7 (very convinced/concerned).
In Table A2, we display the results of several OLS-regressions controlling for different sets
of demographic attributes.20 The coefficients for the three treatment dummies (HIGH, LOW,
IRRELEVANT) provide further support for the key results obtained from non-parametric tests:
the coefficient for HIGH is positive and significant in all three specifications, whereas the coefficient
for LOW is insignificant throughout. Providing irrelevant information also has no significant impact
on giving. Some of the coefficients for the control variables are in line with previous findings from
the literature on pro-social behaviour and indicate a positive relationship with age [43,58] and gender.
Unsurprisingly, those subjects stating a greater concern for the public good provided by their donations
(climate change mitigation) give higher amounts.
Table A2. Regression results: treatment effects and demographic attributes.
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Contributions Contributions Contributions
High (0 = No, 1 = Yes) 17.47 *** 17.34 *** 18.27 ***
(5.521) (6.079) (5.489)
Low (0 = No, 1 = Yes) −1.367 −7.014 −2.479
(5.901) (6.875) (6.439)
Number (0 = No, 1 = Yes) 2.726 4.514 4.152
(6.924) (7.375) (6.720)
20 Tobit regressions that control for potential censoring of the outcome variable arrive at the same conclusions and are available
from the authors upon request.
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Table A2. Cont.
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Contributions Contributions Contributions
Age (Years) 0.481 *** 0.633 *** 0.519 ***
(0.118) (0.170) (0.156)
Female (0 = No, 1 = Yes) 11.34 *** 7.438 7.553 *
(4.241) (4.846) (4.538)
Education (Years) 0.570 0.632
(0.723) (0.677)
Monthly Net Income (€) −0.00157
(0.00265)
Household Size 4.179 ** 4.446 **
(1.984) (1.929)
Number of Children −0.886 −0.776
(2.547) (2.395)
Climate Change Attitude (1−7) 6.116 *** 6.501 ***
(1.699) (1.604)
Assets (0 = No, 1 = Yes) 2.200
(5.006)
Constant 0.242 −52.73 *** −54.70 ***
(6.645) (15.54) (14.64)
N 273 226 257
R2 0.098 0.174 0.171
Prob> F <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Note: contributions are reported in percentage of endowment; robust standard errors in parentheses;
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Figure A1. Histogram diverging behaviour.
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Figure A2. Histogram diverging beliefs.
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